Much of the literature on rational cryptography focuses on analyzing the strategic properties of cryptographic protocols. However, due to the presence of computationally-bounded players and the asymptotic nature of cryptographic security, a definition of sequential rationality for this setting has thus far eluded researchers.
INTRODUCTION
A recent line of research has considered replacing the traditional cryptographic modeling of adversaries with a game-theoretic one. Rather than assuming arbitrary malicious behavior, participants are viewed as being self-interested, rational entities that wish to maximize their own profit, and that would deviate from a protocol's prescribed instructions if and only if it is in their best interest to do so.
Such game theoretic modeling is expected to facilitate the task of protocol design, since rational behavior may be easier to handle than malicious behavior. It also has the advantage of being more realistic in that it does not assume that some of the parties honestly follow the protocol's instructions, as is frequently done in cryptography.
The interplay between cryptography and game theory can also be beneficial to the latter. For instance, using tools from secure computation, it has been shown how to transform games in the mediated model into games in the unmediated model.
But regardless of whether one analyzes cryptographic protocols from a game theoretic perspective or whether one uses protocols to enhance game theory, it is clear that the results are meaningful only if one provides an adequate framework for such analyses.
Computational Nash Equilibrium
Applying game-theoretic reasoning in a cryptographic context consists of modeling interaction as a game, and designing a protocol that is in equilibrium. The game specifies the model of interaction, as well as the utilities of the various players as a function of the game's outcome. The protocol lays out a specific plan of action for each player, with the goal of realizing some prespecified task. Once a protocol has been shown to be in equilibrium, rational players are expected to follow it, thus reaching the desired outcome.
A key difficulty in applying game-theoretic reasoning to the analysis of cryptographic protocols stems from the latter's use of computational infeasibility. Whereas game theory places no bounds on the computational ability of players, in cryptography it is typically assumed that players are computationally bounded. Thus, in order to retain the meaningfulness of cryptographic protocols, it is imperative to restrict the set of strategies that are available to protocol participants. This gives rise to a natural analog of Nash equilibrium (NE), referred to as computational Nash equilibrium (CNE): any polynomial-time computable deviation of a player from the specified protocol can improve her utility by only a negligible amount (assuming other players stick to the prescribed strategy).
Consider, for example, the following (two-stage, zero-sum) game (related to a game studied by Ben-Sasson et al. [2007] and Fortnow and Santhanam [2010] ), which postulates the existence of a one-way permutation f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n .
Example 1.1 (One-way permutation game).
(1) P 1 chooses some x ∈ {0, 1} n , and sends f (x).
(2) P 2 sends a message z ∈ {0, 1} n .
(3) P 2 wins (gets payoff 1) if z = x (and gets -1 otherwise).
In classical game theory, in all NE of this game P 2 wins, since there always exists some z such that z = x. However, in the computational setting, the following is a CNE: both players choose their messages uniformly at random (resulting in an expected loss for P 2 ). This is true because if P 2 chooses z at random, then P 1 can never improve his payoff by not choosing at random. If P 1 chooses x at random, then by the definition of a one-way permutation, any computationally-bounded strategy σ 2 of P 2 will be able to guess the value of x with at most negligible (in n) probability. Thus, the expected utility of P 2 using σ 2 is negligible, and so he loses at most that much by sticking to his CNE strategy (i.e., picking some z at random).
Computational Subgame Perfection
The notion of CNE serves as a first stepping stone towards a game-theoretic treatment of cryptographic protocols. However, protocols are typically interactive, and CNE does not take their sequential nature into consideration.
In traditional game theory interaction is modeled via extensive games. The most basic equilibrium notion in this setting is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), which requires players' strategies to be in NE at any point of the interaction, regardless of the history of prior actions taken by other players. Basically, this ensures that players will not reconsider their actions as a result of reaching certain histories (a.k.a. "empty threats").
As already noted in previous works (cf. Katz [2008] , Kol and Naor [2008b] , and Ong et al. [2009] ), it is not at all clear how to adapt SPE to the computational setting. A natural approach would be to require the strategies to be CNE at every possible history. However, if we condition on the history, then this means that different machines can and will do much better than the prescribed equilibrium strategy. For example, in the one-way permutation game of Example 1.1, given any message history, a machine M can simply have the correct inverse hardwired.
Although this requirement can be relaxed to ask that the prescribed strategy should be better than any other fixed machine on all inputs, this again may be too strong, since a fixed machine can always do better on some histories. Therefore, it seems that we must accept the following: for any machine M, with high probability over possible message histories, the prescribed strategy does at least as well as M. However, it turns out that this approach also fails to capture our intuitive understanding of a computational SPE (CSPE). Consider the following (two-stage) variant of the one-way permutation game from Example 1.1.
Example 1.2 (Modified one-way permutation game).
(3) If exactly one of P 1 and P 2 send message 0, both players get payoff −2. If both players send message 0, both players get payoff +2. Otherwise, P 2 wins (with payoff +1) if and only if z = x, and the nonwinning player loses (with payoff −1).
Using a similar argument to the one applied in Section 1.1, it can be shown that the strategies in which both players choose a message uniformly at random from {0, 1} n \ {0} satisfy this "probabilistic" variant of CSPE (i.e., that with high probability over possible message histories, the prescribed uniform strategy does at least as well as any alternative strategy). However, this equilibrium does not match our intuitive understanding of SPE: P 1 will prefer to send message 0 regardless of P 2 's strategy, knowing that P 2 will then respond with 0 as well. The threat of playing uniformly from all other messages is empty, and hence should not be admitted by the definition. 1 These examples are rather simple, so it is reasonable to expect that issues arising in their analyses are inherent in many other cryptographic protocols. This raises the question of whether a computational variant of SPE is at all attainable in a cryptographic setting.
At the heart of this question is the fact that essentially any cryptographic protocol carries some small (but positive) probability of being broken. This means that, while there may be a polynomial-time TM that can "perform well" on the average message history, there is no single TM that will do better than all other TMs on every history (as for any history there exists some TM that has the corresponding "secret information" hardwired).
This state of affairs calls for an alternative approach. While such an approach should be meaningful enough to express strategic considerations in an interactive setting, it should also be sufficiently weak to be realizable. As just demonstrated, any approach for tackling this challenge should explicitly address the associated probability of error. It should also take asymptotics into consideration.
OUR RESULTS
We propose a new framework for guaranteeing sequential rationality in a computational setting. Our starting point is a weakening of subgame perfection, called threatfree Nash equilibrium, that is more permissive, but still eliminates the undesirable empty threats of nonsequential solution concepts.
To cast our new solution concept into the computational setting, we develop a methodology that enables us to "translate" arguments that involve computational infeasibility into a purely game theoretic language. This translation enables us to argue about game theoretic concepts directly, abstracting away complications that are related to computation.
In order to demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we revisit the problem of implementing a mediator for correlated equilibria [Dodis et al. 2000] , and propose a protocol that is sequentially rational for a nontrivial class of correlated equilibria (see Section 2.3 for details). Our treatment provides a better understanding of the conditions under which mediators in a correlated equilibrium can be replaced by a stable protocol.
Threat-Free Nash Equilibria
We introduce threat-free Nash equilibria (TFNE), a weakening of subgame perfection whose objective is to capture strategic considerations in an interactive setting. Loosely speaking, a pair of strategies in an extensive game is a TFNE if it is a NE, and if in addition no player faces an empty threat at any history.
The problem of empty threats is the following: in a NE of an extensive game, it is possible that a player plays suboptimally at a history that is reached with probability 0. The other player may strategically choose to deviate from his prescribed strategy and arrive at that history, knowing that this will cause the first player to play an optimal response rather than the prescribed one. In an SPE, this problem is eliminated by requiring that no player can play suboptimally at any history, and so no other player will strategically deviate and take advantage of this.
The main observation leading to the definition of TFNE is that this requirement may be too strong a condition to eliminate such instability: if an optimal response of a player decreases the utility of the other, then this other player would not want to strategically deviate. By explicitly ruling out this possibility, the instability caused by empty threats is eliminated, despite the equilibrium notion being more permissive than subgame perfection.
To make this precise, we give the first formal definition of an empty threat in extensive games. The definition is recursive: Roughly speaking, a player i faces a threat at a history if there is some deviation at that history, along with a threat-free continuation from that history onwards, so that i increases his overall expected payoff when the players play this new deviation and continuation.
We note that the notion of TFNE is strong enough to eliminate the undesirable strategy of playing randomly in the modified OWP game from Example 1.2 -Claim 5.13 shows that in any computational TFNE of this game the second player outputs 0 after history 0.
Strategy-Filters and Tractable Strategies
To cast the definition of TFNE into a computational setting, we map the given protocol into a sequence of extensive games using strategy-filters that map computable strategies into their "strategic representation" (the strategic representation corresponds to the strategy effectively played by a given interactive Turing machine). We can then apply pure game theoretic solution concepts, and in particular our newly introduced concept of TFNE, to understand the strategic behavior of players.
Similarly to the definition of CNE, the computational treatment departs from the traditional game theoretic treatment in two crucial ways. First of all, our definition is framed asymptotically (in order to capture computational infeasibility), whereas traditional game-theory is framed for finitely sized games. Second, it allows for a certain error probability. This is an artifact of the (typically negligible) probability with which the security of essentially any cryptographic scheme can be broken.
Given a cryptographic protocol, we consider a corresponding sequence of extensive games. The sequence is indexed by a security parameter k and an error parameter ε. For each game, we "constrain" the strategies available to players to be a subset of those that can be generated by PPT players in the protocol. Intuitively, the game indexed by (k, ε) contains those strategies that run in time polynomial in k and "break crypto" with probability at most ε. We also require that strategy-filters be PPT-covering: that for any polynomially-small ε, every PPT is eventually a legal strategy, far enough into the sequence of extensive games.
Using this framework we formalize the notion of a computational threat-free Nash equilibrium (CTFNE). To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt at analyzing sequential strategic reasoning in the presence of computational infeasibility.
Applications
Our treatment provides a powerful tool for arguing about the strategic behavior of players in a cryptographic protocol. It also enables us to isolate sequential strategic considerations that are suitable for use in cryptographic protocols (so that the solution concept is not too weak and not too strong).
As a warm up, we demonstrate the applicability of our framework and solution concept to the "coin-flipping game" that corresponds to Blum's coin-flipping protocol [Blum 1981] . One may view this as playing the classic game of matching pennies without simultaneity (but with cryptography). We show that it is possible to exploit the specific structure of the game to implement a correlating device resulting in a CTFNE. This is in contrast to the general approach of Dodis et al. [2000] that only enables one to argue CNE. This result already demonstrates the added strength of our framework and definition.
We then revisit the general problem of implementing a mediator for correlated equilibria [Dodis et al. 2000] , and propose a protocol that is sequentially rational for a non-trivial class of correlated equilibria. In particular, our protocol is in a CTFNE for correlated equilibria that are convex combinations of Nash equilibria and that are "undominated", that is, in which there does not exist any convex combination of Nash equilibria for which both players get a strictly higher expected payoff.
Our treatment explores the conditions under which mediators in a correlated equilibrium can be replaced by a stable protocol, and sheds light on some structural properties of such equilibria.
Finally, we prove a general theorem that identifies sufficient conditions for a TFNE in extensive games. Namely, we show that if an undominated NE has the additional property that no player can harm the other by a unilateral deviation, then that NE must also be threat-free.
Related Work
This article contributes to the growing literature on rational cryptography. Many of the papers in this line of research, such as Dodis et al. [2000] , Halpern and Teague [2004] , Izmalkov et al. [2005] , Abraham et al. [2006] , Gordon and Katz [2006] , Lepinski et al. [2005] , Lysyanskaya and Triandopoulos [2006] , Katz [2008] , Naor [2008a, 2008b] , Katz et al. [2010] , Ong et al. [2009], Micali and Shelat [2009] , Asharov and Lindell [2009] , and Gradwohl [2010] , explore various solution concepts for cryptographic protocols viewed as games (often in the context of rational secret-sharing). Aside from the works of Izmalkov et al. [2005] , Lepinski et al. [2005] , Ong et al. [2009] , and Gradwohl [2010] , who work in a different model, 2 almost all prior literature has considered solution concepts that are non-sequential. More specifically, they use variants of NE such as strict NE, NE with stability to trembles, and everlasting equilibrium.
An additional related work is that of Halpern and Pass [2010b] , in which the authors present a general framework for game theory in a setting with computational cost. While their approach to computational limitations is more general than ours, they only address NE. Halpern and Pass [2010a] extend their model to include sequential equilibrium. However, their notion is very different from ours, and in fact they view the actual process of computation of a Turing machine as an extensive game (regardless of the involvement of this machine in a game). In their model, under a mild condition, their notions of computational Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium are in fact equivalent.
Finally, very recently, Pass and Shelat [2011] presented a notion of robustness to renegotiation that is appropriate for extensive games with computational constraints. While their notion is similar in spirit to ours, it is quite different, and in fact is inapplicable to the problem of implementing a mediator for correlated equilibria. The focus of their paper is the construction of protocols for rational secret-sharing that are robust to renegotiation.
Perfect versus Imperfect Information
Our definitions of TFNE and CTFNE apply to games and protocols with perfect information. These are games in which every action taken or message sent by a player is observed by the other players. The "coin-flipping game" of Section 6 is an example of such a game.
For many cryptographic applications, however, this model does not suffice. While it is often the case that cryptographic protocols do have perfect information, 3 it is also often the case that the actions taken by the players following the protocol are not observed by their opponents. This yields a game of imperfect information because the last part of the interaction is a simultaneous move unobserved by others. This particular structure applies to most examples studied in rational cryptography-protocols for (rational) secret sharing and for implementing a mediator.
In this article, we do not offer a full extension of TFNE and CTFNE to games of imperfect information, but we do offer a partial extension for the particular case of implementing a mediator. In particular, in Section 7.2, we provide one such extension of TFNE to games with simultaneous moves at the leaves. Our extension suffices for our application of implementing a mediator. Finding a general extension is one of the open problems left for future work (see next section).
Future Work
One potential application of our new definition is an analysis of rational secret-sharing protocols. While the design of such a protocol that is in a CTFNE is not within the scope of the current article, we do provide some intuition about why known gradual release protocols satisfy a slightly weaker solution concept. Consider the following simple setting: each of two players knows a bit, and the XOR of the two bits is the secret. Secret exchange protocols, for example Luby et al. [1983] , allow the players to exchange their respective bits and thus learn the secret in such a way that even if one of the players cheats, he can reconstruct the secret with probability at most ε more than the other player. Then, under the assumptions on players' utilities used by Katz et al. [2010] , any unilateral deviation from this protocol can get the deviating player an increase of only O(ε) in utility. However, since the other player can always correctly guess the secret with almost the same probability (up to the additive ε), the potential benefit to a player of deviating, causing the other to deviate, and so on, is also at most O(ε). Thus, this protocol is in a computational variant of ε-NE and is also ε-threat-free. The reason this is weaker than our current solution concept is that we require the benefit from a threat or a deviation to be negligible, whereas in Luby et al. [1983] the ε is polynomially small (in the number of rounds of the protocol).
There are numerous other compelling problems left for future work. The first problem is to extend our definition to games with simultaneous moves. While we do offer a partial extension tailored to the problem of implementing a mediator, the problem of defining CTFNE for general games with simultaneous moves is open. Such a definition would be particularly useful for a sequential analysis of protocols with a simultaneous channel. Another natural extension of the definition is to multiple players, as opposed to 2. Such an extension comes with its own challenges, particularly with regard to the possibility of collusion. A third extension is to incorporate the threat-freeness property with stronger variants of NE, such as stability with respect to trembles, strict NE, or survival of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Finally, we would like to find more applications for our definition. One particularly interesting problem is to extend our results on the implementation of mediators to a larger class of correlated equilibria.
GAME THEORY DEFINITIONS

Extensive Games
Informally, a game in extensive form can be described as a game tree in which each node is owned by some player and edges are labeled by legal actions. The game begins at the root, and at each step follows the edge labeled by the action chosen by the current node's owner. Utilities of players are given at the leaves of the tree. More formally, we have the following standard definition of extensive games (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] ). We will denote the two players by P 1 and P 2 and by P i and P −i , where i ∈ {1, 2} and −i is shorthand for 3 − i. For any extensive game = (H, P, A, u), any player i, and any history h satisfying P(h) = i, we denote by i (h) the set of all probability measures over A(h). We denote by i the set of all strategies σ i of player i in . For each profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) of strategies, define the outcome O(σ ) to be the probability distribution over terminal histories that results when each player i follows strategy σ i . Note that if both σ 1 and σ 2 are deterministic (i.e., deterministic on every history), then so is the outcome O(σ ).
Nash Equilibrium
Each profile of strategies yields a distribution over outcomes, and we are interested in profiles that guarantee the players some sort of optimal outcomes. There are many solution concepts that capture various meanings of "optimal," and one of the most basic is the Nash equilibrium (NE).
Definition 3.3 (Nash equilibrium (NE) ). An ε-Nash equilibrium of an extensive game = (H, P, A, u) is a profile σ * of strategies such that for each player i,
It is a NE if this holds for ε ≤ 0 and a strict NE if it holds for some ε < 0.
One of the premises behind the stability of profiles that are in an ε-NE is that players will not bother to deviate for a mere gain of ε. For applications in cryptography we will generally have ε be some negligible function, and this corresponds to our understanding that we do not care about negligible gains.
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
One of the problems with NE in extensive games is the presence of empty threats: a player's equilibrium strategy may specify a suboptimal strategy at a history that is reached with probability 0. The other player, knowing this, may strategically deviate to reach that history, predicting that the first player will also deviate. For more details and explicit examples, see any textbook on game theory, such as Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] .
The most basic solution to the problem of empty threats is to refine the NE solution, and require a strategy profile to be in a NE at every history in the game. This results in a profile that is in subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
Definition 3.4 (Subgames of Extensive Game). For any 2-person extensive game = (H, P, A, u) and any nonterminal history h ∈ H, the subgame | h is the 2-person
For each profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) of strategies and history h ∈ H, define the conditional outcome O(σ )| h to be the probability distribution over terminal histories that results when the game starts at a history h, and from that point onwards each player i follows strategy σ i .
Definition 3.5 (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) ). An ε-subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive game = (H, P, A, u) is a profile σ * of strategies such that for each player i and each nonterminal history h ∈ H,
for every strategy σ i of player i. It is an SPE if this holds for ε = 0 and a strict SPE if it holds for some ε < 0.
Constrained Games
In the standard game theory literature, where there are no computational constraints on the players, the available strategies σ i of player i are all possible collections σ i (h) h:P(h)=i , where σ i (h) is an arbitrary distribution over A(h). In our setting, however, we will only consider strategies that can be implemented by computationally bounded ITMs. This requires being able to constrain players' strategies to a strict subset of the possible strategies. One natural way to restrict the strategies is to allow only a subset of all distributions over A(h) at each history h. However, this does not enable us to capture more elaborate restrictions, and specifically ones that might result from requiring strategies to be implementable by polynomial-time ITMs. (For example, a player might have for every possible history a strategy that plays best response on that history, but no strategy that plays best response on all histories.) To capture these more elaborate restrictions, we consider player i strategies that are restricted to an arbitrary subset T i of all possible (mixed) strategies. Given a pair T = (T 1 , T 2 ) of such sets, we can then define a constrained version of a game, in which only strategies that belong to these sets are considered.
Definition 3.6 (Constrained Game). Let = (H, P, A, u) be an extensive game and
The T -constrained version of is the game in which the only allowed strategies for player i belong to T i . NE of constrained games are defined similarly to regular NE, except that players' strategies and deviations must be from the constraint sets.
Definition 3.7 (NE in Constrained Games). An ε-Nash equilibrium of a (T 1 , T 2 )constrained version of an extensive game = (H, P, A, u) is a profile σ * ∈ (T 1 , T 2 ) of strategies such that for each player i,
THREAT-FREE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Our starting point is the inadequacy of subgame perfection in capturing sequential rationality in a computational context. As argued in Section 1.2, it is unreasonable to require computationally bounded players to play optimally at every node of a game. In particular, in cryptographic settings this requires breaking the security of the protocol, which is assumed impossible under the computational constraints.
A possible idea might be to require that players "play optimally at every node of the game, under their computational constraints." However, this idea cannot be interpreted in a sensible way. Computational constraints must be defined "globally," and thus the notion of playing optimally under some computational constraint on a particular history is senseless. In particular, for any history of some cryptographic protocol, there is a small machine that plays optimally on this specific history unconditionally (and breaks "cryptographic challenges" appearing in this history, by having the solutions hardwired). This machine is efficient, and so meets essentially any computational constraint. So, while under computational constraints every machine fails on cryptographic challenges in most histories, for every history there is a machine that succeeds. We thus assume that a player chooses his machine before the game starts, and cannot change his machine later.
A New Solution Concept
In light of the preceding discussion, it seems like the solution concept we are looking for has to reconcile the following seemingly conflicting properties.
(1) It implies an optimal strategy for the players under their computational constraints, which implies nonoptimal play on certain histories. (2) It does not allow empty threats, thus implying "sequential rationality."
The crucial observation behind our definition is that in order to rule out empty threats, one does not necessarily need to require that players play optimally at every node, because not every nonoptimal play involves a threat to other players. In fact, in a typical cryptographic protocol, the security of each player builds on other players not playing optimally (because playing optimally would mean breaking the security of the protocol). Thus, a player's "declaration" to play nonoptimally does not necessarily involve a threat: The other players may even gain from it. More generally, even in non-cryptographic protocols, at least in 2-player perfect information games, we can use the following observation: In any computational challenge, either a player gains from the other not playing optimally, or, if he does not gain, he can avoid introducing that computational challenge to the other player. 4 Following this observation, we introduce a new solution concept for extensive games. The new solution concept requires that players play a NE, and moreover, that no player impose an empty threat on the other. At the same time, it does not require players to play optimally at every node. In other words, players may (declare that they will) play nonoptimally off the equilibrium path, yet this declaration of nonoptimal play does not involve an empty threat. We call our new solution concept TFNE, for (empty-)threatfree Nash equilibrium.
To make this observation precise, we introduce a formal definition of an empty threat. An empty threat occurs when a player threatens to play "non-rationally" on some history in order to coerce the other player to avoid this history. Crucially, empty threats are such that, had the threatened player not believed the threat, had he deviated accordingly, and had the threatening player played "rationally," the threatened player would have benefitted. To rephrase our intuition: a player faces an empty threat with respect to some strategy profile if by deviating from his prescribed strategy, and having the other player react "rationally," he improves his payoff (in comparison with sticking to the prescribed strategy and having the other player react "rationally" from then on).
But what does it mean for the other player to react "rationally"? The other player may assume, recursively, that the first player will play a best response, and will not carry out empty threats against him, and so on, leading to a recursive definition.
Vanilla Version
Before giving the general definition of TFNE that we will use, we present a simpler version that has no slackness parameter and that works for games without constrained strategies.
For a player i and a history h, two strategies σ i and π i are equivalent for player i on h if P(h) = i and σ i (h) = π i (h), or P(h) = i. Two strategies differ only on the subgame h if they are equivalent for both players on every nonterminal history that does not have h as a prefix. Formally, they are equivalent for both players on every history in H \{h ∈ H : h = h•h for some h }. For a history h ∈ H, a strategy σ , and a distribution
We now proceed to define a threat at a history h with respect to a profile σ . For any history h ∈ H \ Z, let height(h) be the maximal distance between h and a descendant of h (that is, the leaf that is furthest away from h but lies on the subtree rooted by h). Our definition is inductive, where the induction is on height(h). The base case is when height(h) = 0, that is, when h ∈ Z. In this case, no player is facing a threat at h. The next case is when height(h) = 1, that is, when h is such that for all a ∈ A(h) it holds that h• a ∈ Z. In this case, player P(h) faces a threat if h is reached with positive probability by the profile σ , and if additionally P(h) has a deviation from σ at h that will yield him a strictly higher payoff. For the general case, with height(h) = k, player P(h) faces a threat if h is reached with positive probability by the profile σ , and if additionally P(h) has a deviation from σ at h that is profitable regardless of the strategy being played at histories strictly following h, as long as those strategies do not themselves contain threats. More formally, we present Definition 4.1.
Definition 4.1 (Threat). Let = (H, P, A, u) be an extensive game, and let σ be a strategy profile. Then: -For any history h ∈ H for which height(h) = 0, no player faces a threat at h with respect to σ . -Fix a history h ∈ H for which height(h) = k > 0. Then, player i faces a threat at history h with respect to σ if i = P(h) and there exists a distribution τ = τ (h) over A(h) that satisfies the following: For all π ∈ Cont(h, σ, τ ) and π ∈ Cont(h, σ, σ ) for which no player faces a threat at any h with height(h ) < k it holds that
A strategy profile σ is threat-free on h if for all h = ∅ satisfying h • h ∈ H no player faces a threat at h•h with respect to σ . Note that if h ∈ Z, then any profile is threat-free on h. Note that if h is such that for all a ∈ A(h) it holds that h• a ∈ Z, then any profile is threat-free on h. Additionally, observe that if the history h is reached with probability 0 when the strategy profile σ is played, then again any profile is threat-free on h.
Definition 4.2 (Threat-Free Nash Equilibrium). Let = (H, P, A, u) be an extensive game. A strategy profile σ * is a threat-free Nash equilibrium (TFNE) if:
(1) σ * is a NE of , and (2) for any h ∈ H \ Z, player P(h) does not face a threat at history h with respect to σ * .
The definition of a threat, and hence our notion of a TFNE, would not convey their intended meaning if the sets Cont(h, σ, τ ) and Cont(h, σ, σ ) do not contain at least one profile that is threat-free on h, because then an agent would be facing a threat simply because the condition is vacuously satisfied. To show that this can never be the case, we have the following proposition. PROOF. For any history h ∈ H \ Z, let height(h) be the maximal distance between h and a descendant of h (i.e., the leaf that is furthest away from h but lies on the subtree rooted by h). The proof of the proposition is by induction on height(h).
For the base case height(h) = 1, note that there is exactly one element in Cont(h, σ, τ ), and that this profile is threat-free on h (since τ is a last move of the game and there is no player who faces a threat at a terminal node).
Next, suppose the claim of the proposition holds for all histories h with height(h) < k. We will prove that it holds for histories h with height(h) = k. To this end, fix such a history h 0 , and suppose the children of h 0 in the game tree are h 1 , . . . , h t . Suppose also that P(h 0 ) = i and P(h 1 ) = · · · = P(h t ) = −i, and note that this is without loss of generality.
Consider the profile π 0 that is identical to σ except at history h 0 , and fix π 0 (h 0 ) = τ . We now repeat the following process in succession for each j ∈ {1, . . . , t}: For any such j, let
where the union is over distributions τ j over A(h j ). By the inductive hypothesis, the sets TF(h j ) are nonempty. We then fix a profile π j ∈ TF(h j ) that satisfies
After repeating this process for all h j ∈ {h 1 , . . . , h t } we end up with a profile π t that we claim is threat-free on h. To see this, observe that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the profile π j is threat-free on h j because we chose it to be a threat-free profile from Cont(h j , π j−1 , τ j ). However, since for each j we chose a maximal π j , there are no threats at the histories h j either. Thus, π t is threat-free on h 0 .
The following proposition shows that the notion of a TFNE is a weakening of SPE. Thus, the existence of a TFNE is implied by the existence of an SPE. PROOF. First, note that since σ is an SPE, then in particular it is a NE. Thus, condition (1) of Definition 4.2 is satisfied. We now prove that condition (2) of Definition 4.2 also holds. In particular, we claim that for every h ∈ H \ Z, player P(h) does not face a threat at history h with respect to σ . The proof of this claim is by induction on height(h).
The base case is height(h) = 1. Since all profiles are threat-free on such an h, a threat to player P(h) at h would mean that σ P(h) (h) is a suboptimal move. However, this would imply that σ is not an SPE, a contradiction.
Next, suppose the claim holds for all histories h with height(h) < k. We will prove that it holds for histories h with height(h) = k. A threat to player P(h) at h would mean that there exists a distribution τ = τ (h) over A(h) such that all π ∈ Cont(h, σ, τ ) and π ∈ Cont(h, σ, σ ) that are threat-free on h satisfy
In particular, since σ is threat-free on h by the inductive hypothesis, this would mean that
where σ is the profile that is identical to σ everywhere except at h, and σ (h) = τ (h). However, this would again imply that σ is not an SPE, a contradiction.
Thus, no player faces a threat at any h, and so σ is a TFNE. The converse of this proposition is not true in general. It is easy to see that, given an SPE profile, one can arbitrarily change the strategies at histories off the equilibrium path, and the altered profile will still be a TFNE (the proof of Proposition 4.4 still goes through). This altered profile, however, may no longer be an SPE. Note that the equilibrium path is the same in the original SPE and the altered strategy profile.
However, TFNE weakens SPE not just off the equilibrium path, but also on it. This is demonstrated in Figure 1 a variant of an example from Gradwohl and Heifetz [2011] , in which there exists an equilibrium path implied by a TFNE that is not implied by any SPE.
In this game, there are two deterministic SPE: (a, c, f, g) and (a, c, e, h), yielding payoffs (3, 3) and (3, 2). However, we claim that the profile (b, d, f, h) , yielding payoffs (2, x), form a TFNE. To see this, first observe that if player 1 unilaterally deviates, his payoff will decrease from 2 to 1. If player 2 unilaterally deviates, the equilibrium path, and hence his payoff, will be unchanged. Thus, (b, d, f, h) is a NE.
We now argue that no player faces a threat at any history with respect to (b, d, f, h) . Note that this is immediately true for all histories except the empty history, since they are all off the equilibrium path. Thus, it remains to verify that there is no threat at the empty history either.
To this end, we claim that the profile (a, d, f, h) is threat-free on player 1's first move. This would imply that for every possible deviation at this first move there is a threat-free continuation from a (namely, (d, f, h)) on which player 1 does not gain. Observe that neither player faces a threat at either of their second moves with respect to (a, d, f, h) , since they are off the equilibrium path. To show that player 2 does not face a threat at his first move either, we argue that the profile (a, c, e, g) is threat-free on agent 2's first move. This would imply that for every possible deviation from d at this move there is some threat-free continuation from c (namely, (e, g)) on which player 2 does not gain. To see that (a, c, e, g) is threat-free on player 2's first move, observe that player 1 does not face a threat at his second move with respect to either (a, c, e, g) or (a, c, e, h) . Player 2 does not face a threat at his second move with respect to (a, c, e, g) since a deviation to f would yield him a payoff of 2, but there is a profile that is threat-free at this second move (namely, (a, c, e, h)) on which his payoff is 3. Thus, the deviation to f does not always increase his payoff, and so he does not face a threat at his second move with respect to (a, c, e, g) .
In the preceding example, the fact that there is a TFNE whose equilibrium path is distinct from all SPE relies heavily on the fact that player 1 receives the same payoff regardless of his action in his last information set. Such an example does not exist in the class of generic games, in which each player's possible payoffs are distinct. The following proposition states that in generic games, for every equilibrium path implied by a TFNE there is a corresponding SPE that has the same path. PROPOSITION 4.5. For any generic extensive game = (H, P, A, u) and profile σ that is a TFNE, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium π such that the equilibrium path of π and σ are the same.
PROOF. Since is generic, there is a unique SPE, and it is deterministic. We will show that this SPE π has the same equilibrium path as σ . We begin with the following claim.
CLAIM 4.6. For any player i, history h ∈ H \ Z with P(h) = i that is reached with positive probability by σ , and distribution τ over A(h), the set Cont(h, σ, τ ) contains exactly one profile σ that is threat-free on h, and that profile satisfies
PROOF. The proof of the claim is by induction on height(h). For the base case height(h) = 1, note that there is exactly one element in Cont(h, σ, τ ) , and that this profile is threat-free on h (since τ is a last move of the game and no player faces a threat at a terminal node). Furthermore, since height
Next, suppose the claim holds for all histories h with height(h) < k. We will prove that it holds for histories h with height(h) = k. To this end, fix such a history h 0 , and suppose the children of h 0 in the game tree are h 1 , . . . , h t . Suppose also that P(h 0 ) = i and P(h 1 ) = · · · = P(h t ) = −i, and note that this is without loss of generality.
where the union is over distributions τ j over A(h j ). For each such τ j , the inductive hypothesis implies that either h j is not reached with positive probability by the profile π j−1 , or that the set Cont(h j , π j−1 , τ j ) contains exactly one profile σ j that is threat-free on h j . In the latter case, it holds that
We next fix a profile π j ∈ TF(h j ) that satisfies
for all π ∈ TF(h j ). Because payoffs for player −i are distinct, it must be the case that there exists a unique maximal π j . That is, there can be no π that is different from π j and has the same payoff for player −i. Furthermore, because O(π j )| h = O(π )| h for every h ∈ {h j • a : a ∈ supp(τ j )}, it must be the case that π j (h j ) = π (h j ). After repeating this process for all h j ∈ {h 1 , . . . , h t } we end up with a profile π t that we claim is threatfree on h. To see this, observe that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the profile π j is threat-free on h j because we chose it to be a threat-free profile from Cont(h j , π j−1 , τ j ). However, since for each j we chose a maximal π j , there are no threats at the histories h j either. Thus, π t is threat-free on h 0 . Furthermore, by our choices of π j , it is also the case that, if h 0 is reached by σ with positive probability, then O(π t )| h = O(π )| h for every h ∈ {h • a : a ∈ supp(τ )}. Finally, uniqueness of π t is guaranteed by the fact that for each j, our choice of a maximal π j was unique.
The claim implies that for every distribution τ over A(∅), the set Cont(∅, σ, τ ) contains exactly one profile σ that is threat-free on h, and that this profile satisfies O(σ )| h = O(π )| h for every h ∈ {h • a : a ∈ supp(τ )}. Because payoffs of player P(∅) are unique, there exists a unique a ∈ A(∅) for which O(σ )| a yields a maximal payoff for player P(∅). Furthermore, the claim implies that the outcome O(σ )| a is the same as the outcome O(π )| a . The fact that σ is threat-free implies that σ (∅) must equal the deterministic strategy of player a. Furthermore, this first move is equivalent to the first move made in the TFNE π. The outcome O(σ ) is therefore equivalent to the outcome O(π ).
Round-Parameterized Version
For games induced by cryptographic protocols, we will need a more general definition of TFNE. We assume that in these games players alternate moves -player i makes the first move in the game, and regardless of his action, player −i makes the next move, then again i, and so on. Thus, there is a natural notion of the "rounds" in the game: Player i makes a move in round 1, then player −i makes a move in round 2, and so on until the end of the game. If round R is the last round in which a player makes a move, then round R + 1, the histories of which define players' payoffs, is called the terminal round.
For the general definition, we introduce a few modifications to the vanilla version.
-We add a slackness parameter ε. This is necessary for our applications in order to handle the probability of error inherent in almost all cryptographic protocols. -We allow players to be threatened at rounds, rather than just specific histories. This is needed because when we add the slackness parameter, a player might be threatened at a set of histories, where the weight of each individual threat does not exceed the slackness parameter, but the overall weight does.
The definitions that follow make use of the notion of a round R strategy of player i: This is simply a function mapping every history h that reaches round R to a distribution over A(h). For a round R ∈ N, we let σ i (R) represent player i's round R strategy implied by σ . Let σ (R) = (σ 1 (R), σ 2 (R)), and let
where T = (T 1 , T 2 ) consists of constraints for players' strategies.
Definition 4.7 (ε-Threat). Let = (H, P, A, u) be an extensive game with constraints T = (T 1 , T 2 ). Let ε ≥ 0, let σ ∈ T be a strategy profile, and let R ∈ N be a round of . Player i faces an ε-threat at round R with respect to σ if R is not a terminal round, player i = P(R), and there exists a round R strategy τ = τ (R) for player i such that
where strategy π is ε-threat-free on R if for all rounds S > R it holds that no player faces an ε-threat at round S with respect to π .
Note that if R is the last round in which a player makes a move, then any profile π ∈ T is ε-threat-free on R.
Using Definition 4.7, we can now define an ε-TFNE.
Definition 4.8 (ε-Threat-Free Nash Equilibrium). Let = (H, P, A, u) be an extensive game with constraints T = (T 1 , T 2 ). A strategy profile σ * ∈ T is an ε-threat-free Nash equilibrium (ε-TFNE) if:
(1) σ * is an ε-NE of , and (2) for any nonterminal round R of , player P(R) does not face an ε-threat at round R with respect to σ * .
As is the case for Definition 4.1, Definition 4.7 (and hence Definition 4.8) would not convey their intended meaning if either one of the sets Cont(σ (1) , . . . , σ (R−1), τ (R)) or Cont(σ (1), . . . , σ (R)) would not contain at least one profile π that is ε-threat-free on R.
The following proposition shows that this can never be the case. 1), . . . , σ (R− 1), τ (R)) is nonempty, then it contains at least one profile π that is ε-threat-free on R.
PROOF. For any round R of , let height(R) be the distance between h and the terminal round of . The proof of the proposition is by induction on height(R).
For the base case height(R) = 1, note that, by the hypothesis of the proposition, the set Cont(σ (1), . . . , σ (R−1), τ (R)) is nonempty. Since R is the last nonterminal round of the game, the set contains exactly one profile, (σ (1), . . . , σ (R−1), τ (R)), and this profile is ε-threat-free on R because no player faces a threat at the terminal round R + 1.
Next, suppose the claim of the proposition holds for all rounds R with height(R) < k. We will prove that it holds for round R satisfying height(R) = k. Let i = P(R), and assume that there exists some π ∈ Cont(σ (1), . . . , σ (R−1), τ (R)). We would like to show that Cont(σ (1), . . . , σ (R−1), τ (R)) contains at least one profile π that is ε-threat-free on R.
By the inductive hypothesis we have that, for any round R + 1 strategy τ of player −i, if the set Cont(σ (1), . . . , σ (R − 1), τ (R), τ (R + 1)) is nonempty then it contains at least one profile that is ε-threat-free on R + 1 (since height(R + 1) < k). We will choose a profile that has a maximal τ as follows. Let
and note that TF(R + 1) must be nonempty. This is because there always exists at least one τ for which Cont(σ (1), . . . , σ (R − 1), τ (R), τ (R + 1)) is nonempty: namely, we could have τ (R + 1) = π (R + 1). Since Cont(σ (1), . . . , σ (R − 1), τ (R), π (R + 1)) is nonempty by assumption, it must contain a profile that is ε-threat-free on R + 1 (by the inductive hypothesis).
We now choose a profile π ∈ TF(R + 1) that satisfies
for all π ∈ TF(R + 1). So now we have a profile π ∈ Cont(σ (1), . . . , σ (R− 1), τ (R)), which we claim is ε-threat-free on round R. To see this, note that π is ε-threat-free on R + 1 by the way we chose it (i.e., a profile from Cont(σ (1), . . . , σ (R − 1), τ (R), τ (R + 1)) that is ε-threat-free on R + 1). However, since we chose a maximal τ (up to ε), there is no ε-threat at round R + 1 either. Thus, π is ε-threat-free on R.
THE COMPUTATIONAL SETTING
In the following, we explain how to use the notion of TFNE for cryptographic protocols. In Section 5.1, we describe how to view a cryptographic protocol as a sequence of extensive games. In Section 5.2, we show how to translate the behavior of an interactive TM to a sequence of strategies. In Section 5.3, we show how to express computational hardness in a game-theoretic setting. Finally, in Section 5.4, we give our definition of computational TFNE.
Protocols as Computational Games with Prescribed Strategies
When placing cryptographic protocols in the framework of extensive games, the possible messages of players in a protocol correspond to the available actions in the game tree, and the prescribed instructions correspond to a strategy in the game. The protocol is parameterized by a security parameter k ∈ N. The set of possible messages in the protocol, as well as its prescribed instructions, typically depend on this k. Assigning for each k and each party a payoff for every outcome, a protocol naturally induces a sequence (k) = (H (k) , P (k) , A (k) , u (k) ) of extensive games, where the following holds.
-H (k) is the set of possible transcripts of the protocol (sequences of messages exchanged between the parties). A history h ∈ H (k) is terminal if the prescribed instructions of the protocol instruct the player whose turn it is to play next to halt on input h. The set of terminal histories is Z (k) . Remark 5.1. In the following, we will consider games played by Turing machines. Thus, actions will be represented by strings. As opposed to traditional game theory, where players are computationally unbounded, in our case the names of the actions will be significant. For example, in the One-way Permutation Game, if we encode player 1's action f (x) by the string x for every x ∈ {0, 1} k , then inverting the one-way permutation becomes easy for player 2. However, to avoid too much notation, we will identify actions with their string representation. The reader should keep in mind, however, that actions are always strings, and that changing the string representation of actions might be with loss of generality.
Strategic Representation of Interactive Machines
Protocols are defined in terms of interactive Turing machines (ITMs) (see Goldreich [2001] for a formal definition). More specifically, the prescribed behavior for each player is defined via an ITM, and any possible deviation of this player corresponds to choosing a different ITM. In order to argue about the protocol in a game-theoretic manner we formalize, using game-theoretic notions, the strategic behavior implied by ITMs. We believe this formalization is necessary for our treatment or any game-theoretic analysis of ITMs -it helps illuminate some subtle issues arising from the use of Turing machines in game theory, and, to the best of our knowledge, has never been done before. However, because this section somewhat departs from the main thrust of this article, the reader may skip to Section 5.3, keeping the following (informally stated) conclusion in mind: The strategic behavior of an ITM for player i in a protocol may be seen as a collection of independent distributions on actions, one for each of player i's histories that are reached with positive probability given the ITM of player i and some strategy profile of the other players. We refer to this collection as the behavioral reduced strategy induced by the ITM.
When considering some computational game (k) in a sequence = { (k) } k∈N and an ITM "playing" this game (with input 1 k ), the machine does not, strictly speaking, define a strategy. Informally, the machine specifies how to play only on histories that are not inconsistent with the specification on earlier histories in the game. That is, an ITM for player i specifies distributions on actions for all histories on which it is player i's turn, except those it cannot reach based on its own specification on earlier histories. This is the case, because when fixing the other player's moves, the distribution on actions the machine plays on a history that cannot be reached is simply undefined, as we are conditioning on an event with probability 0. More precisely, the distribution on an ITM's action (message) given some history is derived from the distribution on its preceding internal state, conditioned on reaching that history (because different internal states will imply different distributions on actions). Now, consider a minimal history h = (a 1 , . . . , a m ) for which an ITM M will never play (that is, a m−1 is reached with positive probability, but given history h = (a 1 , . . . , a m−1 ), M plays a m with zero probability). Then, for history h, there is no such corresponding distribution on preceding internal states: The meaning of the assumption that M never plays a m after h = (a 1 , . . . , a m−1 ) is that no internal state that it reaches after playing a m−2 yields a positive probability to the reaction a m on the other player's action a m−1 . It follows that the conditional probability on M's internal state given history h is undefined, and thus the distribution on actions of M given h is undefined.
To illustrate this somewhat subtle idea, let's look at the following informal example, which uses the fact that the task of factoring numbers to their prime factors is believed to be a "hard" task.
(1) P 1 sends a number N to P 2 .
(2) P 2 sends a pair of numbers (a, b).
-If a and b are primes and a · b = N, payoffs are (−1, 1). (3) Otherwise, P 1 sends a pair of numbers ( p, q).
-If p and q are primes and p · q = N, payoffs are (1, −1).
-Otherwise, payoffs are (0, 0). Now, consider the ITM M 1 that chooses randomly two large prime numbers p and q (which is a computationally easy task), and sends N = p· q to P 2 . Then, if it gets to play the third round (which means P 2 failed to factor, which is very likely as it is assumed to be a hard task), it sends ( p, q) and wins.
We now may ask "what does M 1 play on history (17, (2, 3))?" However, this question is undefined, because 17 is not a product of two prime numbers, and so M 1 will never send "17" in Round 1. Thus, there is no distribution on M 1 's internal states at the beginning of Round 3, conditioned on the history (17, (2, 3) ). The point is that M 1 always reaches Round 3 with its internal state holding the decomposition of N to two primes, and so there is no point in asking how it behaves when this is not the case. This illustrates that M 1 defines a reduced strategy, rather than a (regular) strategy.
In the following, we show that the prescribed behavior of an ITM can be seen as a convex combination of reduced strategies (which we call mixed reduced strategy), to be defined next. We then define the natural analogue of behavioral reduced strategy, and argue that for every mixed reduced strategy there exists a behavioral reduced strategy that is outcome-equivalent. We will eventually use behavioral reduced strategies to describe the behavior induced by ITMs.
Definition 5.2 (Reduced Strategy (adapted from Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] )). Given a game = (H, P, A, u) , a (pure) reduced strategy for player i is a function σ i whose domain is a subset of {h ∈ H|P(h) = i} with the following properties:
-For every h in the domain of σ i it holds that σ i (h) ∈ A(h).
-h = (a 1 , . . . , a m ) is in the domain of σ i if and only if for any 1 ≤ ≤ m − 1 such that P(a 1 , . . . , a ) = i it holds that (a 1 , . . . , a ) is in the domain of σ i and σ i (a 1 , . . . , a ) = a +1 .
Definition 5.3 (Mixed Reduced Strategy). A mixed reduced strategy for player i is a distribution over reduced strategies for player i.
Given an ITM for (k) , for every instance of internal randomness for that machine (i.e., a vector of coins), the induced behavior of that ITM is exactly a reduced strategy. This is the case because for every profile of pure strategies (or reduced pure strategies) of the other players, the randomness naturally defines an action for every history that is consistent with its previous actions (the sequence of these actions, together with the profile, defines the outcome of the game), and on the other hand, naturally the randomness does not define an action for histories that are not consistent with that randomness (as with that randomness the machine will never reach these histories). It follows that an ITM defines a distribution over reduced (pure) strategies, that is, a mixed reduced strategy. We now formalize this claim.
Definition 5.4 (Induced Mixed Reduced Strategy of an ITM). Let M be a probabilistic ITM for player i in the extensive game . Assume that M halts for any infinite vector of coins and any sequence of messages sent by the other players, 6 and let t be a bound on the number of coins it reads. Let r be a (sufficiently long) coin vector for M. Then the induced pure reduced strategy σ (r) i of M with randomness r is defined as follows.
-h = (a 1 , . . . , a m ) is in the domain of σ (r) i if and only if: -P(a 1 , . . . , a m ) = i; -For any 1 ≤ ≤ m − 1 such that P(a 1 , . . . , a ) = i it holds that (a 1 , . . . , a ) is in the domain of σ (r) i and when M with randomness r participates in an interaction, conditioned on the sequence of sent messages being (a 1 , . . . , a ) (where a +1 is a message sent by the ITM representing player P(a 1 , . . . , a ) for any 1 ≤ ≤ m − 1), the message sent by M is a +1 . 7 -For any h = (a 1 , . . . , a m ) in the domain of σ (r) i , the action σ (r) i (a 1 , · · · , a m ) is the message sent by M with randomness r conditioned on the sequence of sent messages being (a 1 , . . . , a m ).
The mixed reduced strategy induced by M is now defined as follows: the probability assigned to any pure reduced strategy σ is the probability that the induced reduced strategy of M with randomness r is σ , where r is uniformly chosen from U t , the uniform distribution over {0, 1} t . 6 By this, we mean that there is no infinite sequence of coins that will make the machine run forever. For example, a machine that reads the next coin, if it's 0 outputs some message, and otherwise (if it's 1), reads the next coin, and so on, will run forever on the infinite sequence of coins 1*. 7 For completeness, we may assume that whenever M outputs on history h an action that is not in A(h), we interpret it as abort, which is denoted in the induced game by ⊥ and is always a legal action.
In Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] , it is shown that for perfect-recall extensive games (which are the only games we will consider here), every mixed strategy has a behavioral strategy that is outcome equivalent. (Two strategies are outcome-equivalent if for every profile of pure strategies of the other players the two strategies induce the same distribution on outcomes; A mixed strategy is a distribution on pure strategies). Next, we define the behavioral analogue of a mixed reduced strategy, and argue that the same holds for mixed and behavioral reduced strategies: For perfect-recall extensive games, every mixed reduced strategy has a behavioral reduced strategy that is outcome equivalent.
Definition 5.5 (Behavioral Reduced Strategy). Given a game = (H, P, A, u) , a behavioral reduced strategy for player i is a collection σ i = σ i (h) h∈H of independent probability measures, where H is a subset of {h ∈ H|P(h) = i}, with the following properties: . . . , a m ) is in H if and only if for any 1 ≤ ≤ m − 1 such that P(a 1 , . . . , a ) = i it holds that (a 1 , . . . , a ) ∈ H and σ i (a 1 , . . . , a )(a +1 ) > 0.
CLAIM 5.6. Every mixed reduced strategy has a behavioral reduced strategy that is outcome equivalent.
PROOF SKETCH. Every pure reduced strategy σ i for player i can be extended to a (full) pure strategy by assigning arbitrary values to all histories in {h : P(h) = i} for which σ i is undefined. The two strategies will be outcome-equivalent, as the outcome is only affected by the consistent histories of σ i . It follows that every mixed reduced strategy can be extended to a mixed (full) strategy that is outcome-equivalent.
On the other hand, every behavioral strategy σ i = (σ i (h)) h:P(h)=i can be restricted to a behavioral reduced strategy by restricting the collection of probability measures accordingly. Again, the two strategies will be outcome-equivalent, as the distribution on outcomes is only affected by the consistent histories of σ i .
Finally, as mentioned in Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] , it is shown that, for perfectrecall extensive games, every mixed strategy has a behavioral strategy that is outcome equivalent.
Thus, given some mixed reduced strategy, we extended it to a mixed strategy that is outcome equivalent, then transform it to a behavioral strategy that is outcome equivalent, and finally we restrict the resulting behavioral strategy to an outcomeequivalent behavioral reduced strategy.
As previously argued, ITMs induce mixed reduced strategies, and by Claim 5.6, these induce behavioral reduced strategies. Thus, in the following, we will model ITMs by behavioral reduced strategies. This is captured by the notion of strategic representation.
Definition 5.7 (Strategic Representation of an ITM). Let be a game and let i ∈ {1, 2}. Let M be an ITM for player i. Assume that M halts for any infinite vector of coins and any sequence of messages sent by the other players. Let σ be the mixed reduced strategy induced by M. Then, the strategic representation of M is the behavioral reduced strategy that is outcome-equivalent to σ . 8 Similarly, for a sequence of games { (k) } k∈N and an ITM M that takes a security parameter 1 k , the strategic representation of M is the sequence of strategic representations of M(1), M(1 2 ), M(1 3 ), . . . .
ε-TFNE
for Reduced Strategies. In Section 4.3, we presented our general definition of TFNE. However, that definition was framed for strategies and, following the conclusion of the previous section, we actually care about reduced strategies. To make Definition 4.8 work for reduced strategies, we notice that only two small changes need to be made: We need to define the notion of a round R reduced strategy, and we need to allow the constraint sets T 1 and T 2 to include behavioral reduced strategies.
Definition 5.8 (Round R Reduced Strategy). Let = (H, P, A, u) be an extensive game, let R be a round of , and let σ i be a behavioral reduced strategy of player i = P(R). Then, τ = τ (R) is a round R reduced strategy of player i consistent with σ i if the following hold:
-Otherwise, there exists some behavioral reduced strategy π i of player i for which π i ( j) = σ i ( j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , R−1}, and such that π i (R) = τ i (R).
Throughout this article, the behavioral reduced strategy σ i with which τ (R) is consistent will be evident from the context, and so we omit reference to this consistency requirement.
Next, we modify the definition of constraints (Definition 3.6) by allowing each constraint set T i to be a subset of h:
Finally, we observe that, following the two modifications above, Definitions 4.7 and 4.8 work for behavioral reduced strategies as well (replacing "strategy" by "behavioral reduced strategy" and "round R strategy" by "round R reduced strategy").
Computational Hardness in the Game-Theoretic Setting
The security of cryptographic protocols stems from the assumption on the limitation of the computational power of the players. In our strategic analysis of games, we also expect to deduce the (sequential) equilibrium from this limitation. However, because protocols are parameterized by a security parameter, a strategic analysis of protocols requires dealing with a sequence of games rather than a single game. While relating to the sequence of games is crucial in order to express computational hardness (as this hardness is defined in an asymptotic manner), this raises a new difficulty: How do we extend the definition of TFNE to sequences of games?
An appealing approach might be to try to define empty threats for sequences of games. That is, one might consider the effect of deviations on the expected payoff as k goes to infinity (much like the derivation of CNE from NE). However, to the best of our understanding this approach cannot work. Loosely speaking, this is because in order to relate to empty threats one has to consider deviations in internal nodes of the game tree, and it is not clear how to define such deviations for sequences of games. Typically, the structure of the game tree changes with k, so it is not clear even how to define an "internal node" in a sequence of games.
Instead, our approach insists on analyzing empty threats for individual games. Thus, our solution concept reflects a hybrid approach that relates to a protocol both as a family of individual, extensive games and as a sequence of normal-form games. To eliminate empty threats, one must relate to the interactive aspect of each individual game (as this is the setting where threats are defined). In order to claim players are playing optimally under their computational constraints, one must think of the protocol as a sequence of one-shot games (because computational hardness is meaningful only when players are required to choose their machines in advance, and as the traditional notion of hardness is stated asymptotically).
Strategy-Filters.
When considering computational games = { (k) } k∈N , the computational bounds on the players will be expressed by restricting the space of available strategies for the players. The available sequences of reduced strategies for the players will be exactly those that can be played by the ITMs that meet the computational bound on the players. In our case we will consider PPT ITMs.
While on the one hand, every PPT ITM fails on cryptographic challenges for large enough values of the security parameter k (under appropriate assumptions), on the other hand, PPT ITMs can have arbitrarily large size and thus arbitrarily much information hardwired, and so for every k there is a PPT ITM that breaks the cryptographic challenges with security parameter k. In our analysis, we would like to "filter" machines according to their ability to break cryptographic challenges for specific k's, and allow using them only in games that correspond to large enough k's, where these machines fail (and in particular, cannot use hard-wiring to solve the cryptographic challenges).
To this end, we define the notion of a strategy-filter. For each value k of the security parameter and value ε, a strategy-filter maps the ITM M to either ⊥ or to its strategic representation, according to whether M(1 k ) violates level of security ε or does not (respectively).
Definition 5.9 (Strategy-Filter). Let = { (k) } k∈N be a computational game and let i be a player. A strategy-filter is a sequence
is the strategic representation of the machine M(1 k , ·) .
A strategy-filter is meaningful if it allows us to reason about all reduced strategies that are considered to be feasible, in our case PPT implementable reduced strategies, and in particular does not filter them out.
Definition 5.10 (PPT-covering filter). A strategy-filter F i is said to be PPT-covering if, for every PPT ITM M and any positive polynomial p(·), there exists k 0 such that for all k ≥ k 0 , it holds that F (k) i (M, 1/ p(k)) = ⊥. Typically, protocols have the following security guarantee (under computational assumptions): for every i, every PPT ITM M of P i and every polynomial p(·), there exists k 0 such that for any k ≥ k 0 , the ITM M does not break level of security 1/ p(k) in the protocol with security parameter k. Such a protocol will naturally have a PPT-covering filter, where if F (k) i (M, ε) = ⊥, then the reduced strategy F (k) i (M, ε) "does not break level of security ε in the game (k) ." 5.3.2. Tractable Reduced Strategies. As previously reflected, the asymptotic nature of defining cryptographic security does not determine the level of security for any particular k. Rather, it dictates that any PPT ITM "eventually fails in violating 1/ p(k) security" for any p(·) (where "eventually" means for large enough k). Thus, we follow the same approach in our game-theoretic analysis: roughly speaking, our solution concept requires that cryptographic ε-security will imply ε-TFNE for any k (rather than requiring a particular level of slackness in TFNE for each k). More formally, we require that for any k and any ε, the game induced by the protocol with security parameter k be in ε-TFNE, given that the available strategies for the players are those that do not break level ε of cryptographic security. Thus, for any pair (k, ε), we will consider the game (k) with available reduced strategies restricted to those that guarantee cryptographic ε-security. The following definition derives from a PPT-covering filter, for each such game, the set of available reduced strategies for each player.
Definition 5.11 (Tractable Reduced Strategies) . Let F i be a PPT-covering filter. For every k ∈ N and ε ∈ [0, 1], we define the set T (k) i,ε (F i ) of (k, ε)-tractable reduced strategies for player i ∈ {1, 2} as
Whenever F i will be understood from the context, we will write T (k) i,ε to mean T (k) i,ε (F i ).
Computational TFNE
We can now define our computational variant of TFNE. Roughly, the definition requires that there exist a family of PPT compatible constraints such that for any k and any ε, the strategies played by the machines on input security parameter k are in ε-TFNE in the game indexed by (k, ε).
Definition 5.12 (Computational TFNE). Let be a computational game. A pair of PPT machines (M 1 , M 2 ) is said to be in a computational threat-free Nash equilibrium (CTFNE) of if there exists a pair of PPT-covering filters (F 1 , F 2 ) such that for every k, ε for which F (k) 1 (M 1 , ε) and F (k) 2 (M 2 , ε) are tractable the profile (F (k) 1 (M 1 , ε), F (k) 2 (M 2 , ε)) constitutes an ε-TFNE in the (T (k) 1,ε , T (k) 2,ε )-constrained version of (k) . The expressive power of Definition 5.12 is illustrated through the following claim, which refers to Example 1.2. We omit the proof, and proceed to more interesting applications in Sections 6 and 7.
CLAIM 5.13. In the modified one-way permutation game, (i) the strategy profile in which P 1 plays 0 and P 2 plays 0 after a history of 0 and randomly otherwise is a CTFNE, and (ii) any profile in which P 2 plays randomly after history 0 is not a CTFNE.
We note that part (ii) of the claim can easily be extended to profiles in which, after history 0, P 2 plays 0 with probability at most 1 − p(k) for any polynomial p.
THE COIN-FLIPPING GAME
Coin-flipping, introduced by Blum [1981] , is a protocol between two players, at the end of which both players agree on a common uniformly distributed bit-string. The protocol must satisfy the property that neither of the players can control (and, in particular, bias) the distribution of the output string. As shown by Blum [1981] , coin flipping protocols can be constructed in a straightforward way based on any perfectly binding commitment scheme (see Goldreich [2001] for a formal definition).
Commitment schemes are the digital analogue of a locked box. They are implemented using a two-stage interactive protocol between a sender and a receiver. After the first stage of the protocol, which is referred to as the commit stage, the sender is bound to at most one value, not yet revealed to the receiver (this is analogous of sending over a locked box with a value inside it). In the second stage, which is referred to as the reveal stage, the sender reveals its committed value to the receiver (this is analogous to sending over a key for opening the box). The message from the sender to the receiver in this stage is called the decommitment, and it is said to be a legal decommitment if the receiver can indeed verify the value to which the sender committed.
A commitment scheme is said to be perfectly binding if it is impossible for the sender (even a computationally unlimited one) to reveal a value that is different than the one he was bound to in the commit stage. Such commitments are also required to be computationally hiding in the sense that a computationally bounded receiver cannot learn the committed value given the commitment information (however, once given the information from the reveal stage, the receiver can verify the value to which the sender committed).
Perfectly binding commitments can be constructed assuming the existence of any one-way permutation [Blum 1981 ]. 9 The construction is "noninteractive," meaning that the commitment phase consists of a single message sent from the sender to the receiver (as opposed to consisting of messages being sent back and forth between the players).
In the following, we describe a classic protocol for coin-flipping, formulated as a sequence of games (parameterized by a security parameter k). We then show that the prescribed behavior according to that protocol constitutes a CTFNE in the sequence of games.
Following is an informal description of the sequence of games. We assume some perfectly binding non-interactive commitment scheme 10 with the following properties.
-For any security parameter k (which is a common input to the sender and receiver), the "commit" phase consists of one message from the sender to the receiver, denoted com (k) , which is of length bounded by p(k) for some polynomial p. -For any PPT ITM, the advantage in guessing the committed value given the aforementioned message is negligible in k.
The description defines the legal messages in each game. Recall that at any phase where a player is supposed to send a message, the move "abort" is legal (and welldefined). Note also, that any illegal message is interpreted as abort by the other player. The game (k) is defined as follows.
(1) Player 1 chooses a string c of length at most p(k) and sends it to player 2.
(2) Player 2 chooses a bit r 2 , and sends r 2 to player 1.
(3) Player 1 does one of the following: (1) sends to player 2 decom, where decom is a legal decommitment to c revealing that the committed value was 1 − r 2 (in that case the payoffs are (1,0)); or (2) aborts (in that case the payoffs are (0,1)).
Any other abort results in the aborting player receiving payoff 0, and the other player receiving 1. We now describe a pair of interactive ITMs for the game (k) that form a CTFNE. We describe them interleaved, in the form of a protocol. We denote the ITMs playing the strategies of P 1 , P 2 by M 1 , M 2 , respectively.
(1) Player 1 chooses a random bit r 1 , and sends c = com (k) (r 1 ) to player 2 (player 1 also obtains decom, which is a legal decommitment to c). (2) Player 2 chooses a random bit r 2 , and sends r 2 to player 1.
(3) If r 1 = r 2 , player 1 sends decom to player 2. Else, player 1 aborts. THEOREM 6.1. The pair (M 1 , M 2 ) forms a CTFNE for this protocol.
PROOF. First, we define the functions F (k) 1 and F (k) 2 . For any k, the function F (k) 1 never maps to ⊥ (this, roughly speaking, reflects the fact that the protocol is secure against an all-powerful player 1). For F 2 we use the following rule: F (k) 2 (M, ε) = ⊥ if and only if "for security parameter k, the PPT ITM M guesses the committed value with advantage greater than ε." More formally, F (k) 2 (M, ε) = ⊥ if and only if when player 1 sends as the first message a random commitment of a random bit (i.e., chooses a random bit and then uses the aforementioned commitment scheme using uniformly 9 A permutation f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * is said to be one-way if: (1) f (x) is easy to compute given any input x, and (2) the computational problem of inverting f (x), over a choice of a random x, is hard. 10 See Appendix A for a formal definition and the assumption necessary for existence. random coins), then the message with which M reacts is the committed value of player 1 with probability greater than 1/2 + ε.
The fact that F 1 is PPT-covering is straightforward. The fact that F 2 is PPT covering follows directly from the security of the commitment scheme: For any positive polynomial p, every PPT ITM has advantage smaller than 1/ p(k) in guessing the committed value with security parameter k, for large enough k's.
Next, we need to show that for every k, ε for which F (k) 1 (M 1 , ε) = ⊥ and F (k) 2 (M 2 , ε) = ⊥ the profile (F (k) 1 (M 1 , ε) , F (k) 2 (M 2 , ε)) constitutes an ε-TFNE in the T = (T (k) 1,ε , T (k) 2,ε )constrained version of (k) . Let k, ε be as mentioned previously, and let σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = (F (k) 1 (M 1 , ε), F (k) 2 (M 2 , ε)). We first show that σ constitutes an ε-NE in the T -constrained version of (k) .
The strategy σ 1 chooses a random commitment of a random bit in round 1, and in round 3 decommits whenever it can. It is easy to see that this is optimal, as player 2 always guesses the committed value with probability 1/2, and so there is no strategy for player 1 for which he can decommit with probability greater than 1/2 in round 3. It is also easy to see that player 2's strategy is an ε best-response, as any PPT ITM M 2 for player 2 for which F (k) 2 (M 2 , ε) = ⊥ does not guess with advantage more than ε. We conclude that σ constitutes an ε-NE in the T -constrained version of the game (k) .
Next, we show that no player faces an ε-threat with respect to σ at any round of the T -constrained version of (k) . Note that for both players, the expected payoff according to σ is 1/2. Suppose some player faces an ε-threat with respect to σ . We divide the proof into cases.
Case 1. P 1 Faces an ε-Threat in Round 3. In order for P 1 to improve in Step 3 by more than ε, it must play a round 3 strategy τ (3) in which he sends decom that proves that r 1 = r 2 with larger probability than in σ . However, since in σ player 1 sends decom whenever r 1 = r 2 (and otherwise no such decom exists, since the commitment is perfectly binding), we conclude that no such τ (3) exists.
Case 2. P 2 Faces an ε-Threat in Round 2. According to the constraints, P 2 cannot guess r 1 with probability greater than 1/2 + ε. So in order for him to improve by more than ε, it must be the case that he has some round 2 strategy τ (2), such that in any ε-threat-free continuation in Cont(σ (1), τ (2)) player 1 aborts with positive probability conditioned on r 1 = r 2 . However, any continuation where P 1 aborts with zero probability conditioned on r 1 = r 2 (and sends decom) is ε-threat-free, and so there is no deviation for P 2 for which he improves on all ε-threat-free continuation.
Case 3. P 1 Faces an ε-Threat in Round 1. Since σ is ε-threat-free on round 1, if P 1 is threatened in round 1 then he has a round 1 strategy τ (1) so that for all ε-threatfree profiles in Cont(τ (1)) his expected payoff is greater than 1/2 + ε. Consider the profile σ = (τ (1), σ (2), σ (3)). This profile gives both players an expected payoff of 1/2 (assuming τ (1) aborts with probability 0, which is clearly optimal), and is ε-threat-free on round 2 (by the same argument as Case 1). If σ is ε-threat-free on round 1 as well, then P 1 does not improve by more than ε using the deviation τ (1). If σ is not ε-threatfree on round 1, then in any ε-threat-free profile in Cont(τ (1)) player 2's payoff must be greater than 1/2 + ε. However, this means that P 1 's payoff is less than 1/2, and again he does not improve using the deviation τ (1). Hence, the postulated τ (1) does not exist, and so P 1 does not face an ε-threat in round 1.
CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA WITHOUT A MEDIATOR
In one of the first papers to consider the intersection of game theory and cryptography, Dodis et al. [2000] proposed an appealing methodology for implementing a correlated equilibrium in a 2-player normal-form game without making use of a mediator. Under standard hardness assumptions, they showed that for any 2-player normal-form game and any correlated equilibrium σ for , there exists a new 2-player extensive "extended game" and a CNE σ for , such that σ and σ achieve the same payoffs for the players. (Strictly speaking is a sequence of games indexed by a security parameter, and a CNE is defined for a sequence.) However, as already pointed out by Dodis et al., their protocol lacks a satisfactory analysis of its sequential nature -the resulting "extended game" is an extensive game, but the solution concept they use, CNE, is not strong enough for these games.
In the following, we extend the definition of CTFNE to allow handling this setting (i.e., we define CTFNE for extensive games with simultaneous moves at the leaves), give some justification for our new definition, and then provide a new protocol for removing the mediator that achieves CTFNE in a wide class of correlated equilibria that are in the convex hull of Nash equilibria (see definition).
The Dodis-Halevi-Rabin Protocol
The "extended game" consists of 2 phases. In the first phase ("preamble phase"), the players execute a protocol for sampling a pair under the distribution σ , and in the second phase each player plays the action implied by the sampled pair, in the original normal-form game. The CNE of the extended game is the profile that consists of each player playing the protocol honestly in the first phase, and then in the second phase, if the other player did not abort, choosing the action by the protocol's result, and otherwise "punishing" the other player by choosing a "min-max" action (i.e., choosing an action minimizing the utility resulting from the other player's best response).
This profile is indeed a CNE because an efficient player can achieve only a negligible advantage by trying to break the cryptography in the first phase, cannot achieve any advantage by aborting in the first phase (as this minimizes its best possible move in the second phase), and cannot gain any advantage in the expectation of the payoff by deviating in the second phase, because the players are playing a pair of actions from a correlated equilibrium.
TFNE for Games with Simultaneous Moves at the Leaves
The definition of an extensive game with simultaneous moves is similar to the definition of an ordinary extensive game. The main difference is that now the function P maps to (nonempty) sets of players rather than to single players. The definition of history is then changed to a sequence of sets of actions rather than a sequence of actions, and the definitions of a strategy and a payoff function are both also changed accordingly. For a formal definition, see Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] .
In order to adjust our definition for extensive games with simultaneous moves, we notice that when a player deviates on a history with a simultaneous move, he cannot expect the other to react to this deviation (because they both play at the same time). However, in order to argue that a profile is rational, we still need to require that for every simultaneous move in the equilibrium support, each player is playing a "best response" given the other player's prescribed behavior. This means the prescribed behavior for the players should form some kind of equilibrium for normal-form games. In our case, the prescribed behavior will form a NE. The question of what should a CTFNE profile prescribe in off-equilibrium-support histories is more delicate: Clearly, in order to claim that the profile is "rational," again we need some kind of equilibrium for normal-form games. In our case, the only deviation will be prematurely aborting without completing the preamble phase, which leads to the original normal-form game without agreeing on a sampled pair. In this case, one can argue that after one player aborted, the other (nonaborting) player cannot assume the aborting player will play his prescribed behavior in the simultaneous move (as he is already not following his prescribed behavior). However, we argue that it is in fact still rational to assume the aborting player will play his prescribed behavior. The justification for this claim is essentially the same as the justification for the rationality of NE. Once there is a prescribed behavior that is a NE, each player knows the other has no incentive to deviate, and so he also has no incentive to deviate. The essential difference between a deviation in an extensive game and a deviation in a simultaneous move, is that in the former, once a player deviated, the other player faces a fact. He now has to readjust his behavior according to this deviation. However, in the latter, there is no point for a player to deviate from the prescribed NE, because the other player will not know about this deviation prior to choosing his move (if at all). Thus, for terminal leaves that are off-equilibrium-support (i.e., in the original normal-form game that follows an abort of some player), we claim it is sufficient for a CTFNE to prescribe a NE as well.
The bottom line of this discussion is that players can assume other players will not deviate from any prescribed NE in any terminal leaf. Thus, our new definition of TFNE for extensive games with simultaneous moves at the leaves (abbreviated GSML) is essentially the same as the original definition, except that (i) we require a profile in TFNE to prescribe a NE in any terminal leaf, and (ii) in the definition of a threat we do not allow a player to assume the other will deviate from his strategy in any NE at a terminal leaf. In order to formally modify our definition of TFNE to achieve (ii), essentially we would need to define the only threat-free continuation on a leaf to be the one that assigns to the players the actions in the prescribed NE (which expresses the idea that a player is not allowed to assume the other will deviate from his strategy in any NE).
However, we adopt an equivalent, simpler convention. Given a GSML and a profile σ that assigns a NE at every simultaneous move, we look at a slightly modified game : All simultaneous moves are removed, and instead at each leaf where a simultaneous move was removed each player is assigned his expected payoff in the corresponding NE for that leaf. Note that the modified game is now a regular extensive game with no simultaneous moves. We then "prune" the strategy profile to remove all the distributions on actions on all simultaneous leaves and denote the resulting profile σ . We say that σ is a TFNE in if σ is a TFNE in . We call and σ the pruned representation of and σ .
The definition of CTFNE for GSML is derived from the above definition of TFNE for GSML, similarly to the derivation of CTFNE from TFNE in the nonsimultaneous case.
A Note on the Strength of Our Definition. It seems that, for general GSMLs, our definition is too strong. The reason is that in certain cases it is computationally intractable for the players to play the prescribed NE in every leaf (it is easy to construct simple sequences of games where one cannot assign tractable Nash equilibria at all leaves). While we do not yet know how to relax our definition to apply to these cases, we believe our definition, when met, is sufficient.
Our Protocol
For a nontrivial class of correlated equilibria, we show how to modify the DHR protocol to achieve CTFNE. Our basic idea is to use Nash equilibria as "punishments" for aborting players. That is, if there is a NE that assigns to a player a payoff at most his expected payoff when not aborting, then assigning this NE in case he aborts serves as a punishment and yields that the player has no incentive to abort. In the following, we characterize a family of correlated equilibria for which we can use the aforementioned punishing technique, and prove that for this family we can remove the mediator while achieving CTFNE.
We say that a correlated equilibrium π is a convex combination of Nash equilibria if π is induced by a distribution on (possibly mixed) Nash equilibria. (The set of such distributions is sometimes referred to as the convex hull of Nash equilibria.) Note that any such distribution is a correlated equilibrium (CE), but the converse is not true.
Let π be a correlated equilibrium for a two-player game that is a convex combination of a set N of NEs. We say that π is weakly Pareto optimal if there does not exist a different CE ρ in the convex hull of N for which both E [u 1 (O(ρ))] > E [u 1 (O(π ))] and E [u 2 (O(ρ))] > E [u 2 (O(π))].
We say that a distribution is samplable if there exists a probabilistic TM that halts on every infinite randomness vector, and can sample it. This is equivalent to requiring that all probabilities can be expressed in binary (assuming we work over {0, 1}). Note that every distribution can be approximated arbitrarily accurately by a samplable distribution.
THEOREM 7.1. Assume there exists a non-interactive computationally binding commitment scheme. Let π be a weakly Pareto optimal correlated equilibrium for a twoplayer game that is a samplable convex combination of some set of samplable Nash equilibria. Then, there exists an extended extensive game and a profile that achieves the same expected payoffs as π and is a CTFNE.
Theorem 7.1 is related to the results of Section 9(b) of Aumann and Hart [2003] . In that section, the authors discuss the set of payoffs that can be obtained by a Bayesian NE of a cheap talk extension when agents do not send messages simultaneously. For the case of complete information, Aumann and Hart [2003] argue that the set of possible payoffs is the bi-span 11 of NE payoffs of the game. Theorem 7.1 states that any correlated equilibrium that is a weak Pareto optimal convex combination of NE can be implemented. In general, the bi-span of payoffs and weakly Pareto optimal payoffs are not comparable, as neither implies the other: An example of this is demonstrated by the example of Aumann and Hart [2003] in section 9(b). Thus, the Pareto optimality assumption we use is not necessary.
We now prove Theorem 7.1.
PROOF. Since is samplable, the common denominator of all probabilities in is a power of two. Thus, we can assume is a uniform distribution on a sequence of Nash equilibria that may contain repetitions, where the length of the sequence is a power of two. Let 2 be the length of that sequence, and let (π 0 , . . . , π 1 ) be that sequence. Note that the distribution π can now be generated by first choosing uniformly at random a string r in {0, 1} , and then choosing a pair of actions according to π r .
Let σ i be the NE that assigns the worst payoff for P i (this value represents the "severest punishment" for player i).
Our protocol embeds a 2-party string sampling protocol, which is a simple generalization of the Blum coin flipping protocol [Blum 1981 ]. The protocol consists of simply running the Blum protocol in parallel for a fixed number of times. This protocol, in turn, relies on a perfectly binding commitment scheme as in Section 6, whose formal definition can be found in Appendix A.
As in Section 6, we describe the two ITMs that form the protocol in an interleaved manner. We denote the ITMs playing the strategies of P 1 , P 2 by M 1 , M 2 , respectively.
-Round 1: Player 1 chooses uniformly at random a string r = (r 1 , . . . , r ) from {0, 1} , and sends c = (c 1 = com (k) (r 1 ), . . . , c = com (k) (r )) to player 2 (player 1 also obtains which means that A breaks the hiding property of the commitment scheme. This is a contradiction.
Next, we show that for all k, ε for which F (k) 1 (M 1 , ε) =⊥ and F (k) 2 (M 2 , ε) =⊥ the profile (F (k) 1 (M 1 , ε), F (k) 2 (M 2 , ε)) constitutes an ε-TFNE in the T = (T (k) 1,ε , T (k) 2,ε )-constrained version of (k) . Let k, ε be as above, and let σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = (F (k) 1 (M 1 , ε), F (k) 2 (M 2 , ε)). Suppose P 1 unilaterally ε-improves in the T -constrained version of (k) . From similar arguments as above we can assume P 1 never aborts. But when P 1 never aborts the outcome is exactly π, as the players are playing π r⊕r , and r is chosen uniformly at random.
Suppose now that P 2 unilaterally ε-improves in the T -constrained version of (k) . However, this is a contradiction to the constraints, that state that for any k P 2 cannot unilaterally ε-improve in the (T (k) 1,ε , T (k) 2,ε )-constrained version of (k) . Next, we show that no player is ε-threatened with respect to σ at any round of the T -constrained version of (k) . To this end, suppose towards a contradiction that some player is ε-threatened with respect to σ . We divide the proof into cases.
Case 1. P 1 Faces an ε-Threat in Round 3. In step (3), player 1 has exactly two options: He can (i) play honestly, send ((r 1 , decom 1 ), . . . , (r , decom )) which he generated in round 1, and receive E [u 1 (O(σ ))], or he can (ii) abort and receive E [u 1 (O( σ 1 ))]. The value E [u 1 (O( σ 1 ))] is at most E [u 1 (O(σ ))], and so P 1 cannot improve over E [u 1 (O(σ ))]. Hence, player 1 does not face an ε-threat at round 3.
Case 2. P 2 Faces an ε-Threat in Round 2. We first note that for any round 1 strategy for P 1 and round 2 strategy for P 2 , the round strategy of playing honestly in round 3 for P 1 is threat-free, since he cannot improve over that strategy (again, since his only deviation is aborting, which gives him the worst possible NE). Thus, if P 2 is ε-threatened at round 2, he has some round strategy that ε-improves over E [u 2 (O(σ ))] when P 1 plays in round 3 (and 1) according to the protocol. This means that P 2 unilaterally ε-improves, which contradicts the constraints (as well as the ε-NE).
Case 3. P 1 Faces an ε-Threat in Round 1. If P 1 is ε-threatened in round 1, he has some round 1 strategy τ (1) for which every ε-threat-free continuation ε-improves over every ε-threat-free continuation of σ 1 (1). We will describe an ε-threat-free continuation of τ (1) and an ε-threat-free continuation of σ 1 (1) that contradicts this.
The ε-threat-free continuation of σ 1 (1): We established in Case 2 that when P 1 plays honestly in round 1, if P 2 plays honestly in round 2 he is not ε-threatened. We also established there that P 1 playing honestly in round 3 is always ε-threat-free. It follows that the continuation of both players playing honestly in rounds 2 and 3 is an ε-threatfree continuation of σ 1 (1). On this profile, P 1 receives E [u 1 (O(σ ))].
The ε-threat-free continuation of τ 1 (1): As we established in Case 2, playing honestly in round 3 is always ε-threat-free for P 1 . Now, note that there is no profile in which both players improve simultaneously -because all leaves are Nash equilibria, such a profile would be a distribution on Nash equilibria that contradicts the Pareto-optimality of π . Note also that because P 1 receives the worst possible payoff when he aborts, it follows that he improves also conditioned on not aborting (as this can only help him). Thus, in any threat-free continuation of τ (1), conditioned on P 1 not aborting in round 1, P 2 again cannot improve over E [u 2 (O(σ ))], as this again contradicts the Pareto-optimality of π . However, if P 2 plays honestly in round 2 and then P 1 plays honestly in round 3, then P 2 receives exactly E [u 2 (O(σ ))] conditioned on P 1 not aborting in round 1 (because then the players are playing π r⊕r , where r is chosen uniformly at random, and note that for any distribution of r (including whatever P 1 chose in round 1), r ⊕ r is a uniformly random string, exactly like in σ ). It follows that this continuation is the best possible for P 2 , and thus P 2 is not ε-threatened in round 2 of this continuation. It follows that this continuation is ε-threat-free. However, in this continuation, P 1 receives E [u 1 (O(σ ))] conditioned on not aborting, and thus receives at most E [u 1 (O(σ ))] without the conditioning.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
A GENERAL THEOREM
In this section, we prove a general theorem identifying sufficient conditions for a strategy profile to be a TFNE. The first condition is that the profile must be weakly Pareto optimal.
Definition 8.1 (Weakly Pareto Optimal). A strategy profile σ ∈ T of an extensive game = (H, P, A, u) with constraints T is weakly Pareto optimal if there does not exist a strategy profile π ∈ T for which both
Next, we require the profile to be ε-safe. Intuitively, this just means that a player cannot harm the other too much by a unilateral deviation (as opposed to not being able to gain too much, which is the NE condition).
Definition 8.2 (ε-Safe). A strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ T of an extensive game = (H, P, A, u) with constraints T = (T 1 , T 2 ) is ε-safe if for each player i,
Finally, we have the following theorem. Note that we are implicitly assuming that the extensive games in the claim are derived from a cryptographic protocol or some other setting in which it is natural to discuss the "rounds" of a game. THEOREM 8.3. Let = (H, P, A, u) be an extensive game with constraints T = (T 1 , T 2 ), and let σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) be a weakly Pareto optimal ε-NE of that is ε-safe. Then, σ is an ε-TFNE of .
We also have the following corollary, which actually implies the threat-freeness part of Theorem 6.1. COROLLARY 8.4. Let = (H, P, A, u) be a zero-sum extensive game with constraints T = (T 1 , T 2 ), and let σ be an ε-NE of . Then, σ is an ε-TFNE of .
The corollary follows from the observation that any ε-NE of a zero-sum game is both weakly Pareto optimal and ε-safe.
Note that the conditions of Theorem 8.3 are sufficient, but they are certainly not necessary. Consider the example in Figure 2 .
In this game, the profile (L, l), yielding payoffs (1, 1), is a TFNE, even though it is not ε-safe for any ε < 1: A unilateral deviation by either player will decrease the payoff of the other from 1 to 0.
We now proceed to prove Theorem 8.3. The idea of the proof is the following: Starting with the assumption that some player is facing an ε-threat, we let that player "act" on that threat by deviating to improve his payoff. This yields a new strategy profile. We then let him iteratively act on all ε-threats in the new profile, continually increasing his payoff. We then turn to the other, and let him act on his ε-threats, continually increasing his own payoff. The ε-safety property guarantees throughout that when one player acts on his threats, the other is not harmed much. Eventually, this leads to a new profile in which each player has acted on at least one threat, increasing his payoff by more than ε, and in which the other's acting on threats does not decrease that payoff by too much. The final profile is then one in which both players get a payoff that is strictly higher than their payoffs under σ , contradicting the weak Pareto optimality condition.
PROOF. Suppose towards contradiction that at least one of the players faces an εthreat with respect to σ at some round. Let R be the latest such round: that is, player i faces an ε-threat at round R with respect to σ , and no player faces an ε-threat at any round R that follows R.
By Definition 4.7, it follows that there exists a round R strategy τ = τ (R) for player i such that the set Cont(σ (1, . . . , R− 1), τ (R)) is nonempty, and such that for all π ∈ Cont(σ (1, . . . , R−1), τ (R)) and π ∈ Cont(σ (1, . . . , R) ) that are ε-threat-free on R it holds that 1, . . . , R) ) def = π ∈ T : π(S) = σ (S) for all S ≤ R .
Note that σ ∈ Cont(σ (1, . . . , R) ). Also note that, because R is the latest round on which an ε-threat occurs, the profile σ is ε-threat-free on R.
Using inequality (5), we can then infer that for any π ∈ Cont(σ (1, . . . , R−1), τ (R)) that is ε-threat-free on R it holds that
Let π 1 ∈ Cont(σ (1, . . . , R− 1), τ (R)) be one such ε-threat-free profile, and let σ 1 = (π 1 i , σ −i ). Fix R 1 = R and τ 1 = τ for consistent notation. We next ask, is player i facing an ε-threat with respect to σ 1 at any round R that follows R 1 ? If yes, let R 2 be the next such round: there is no R between R 1 and R 2 on which player i faces an ε-threat with respect to σ 1 . By Definition 4.7, it follows that there exists a round R 2 strategy τ 2 for player i such that Cont(σ 1 (1, . . . , R 2 −1), τ 2 (R 2 )) is nonempty, and such that for all π ∈ Cont(σ 1 (1, . . . , R 2 −1), τ 2 (R 2 )) and π ∈ Cont(σ 1 (1, . . . , R 2 )) that are ε-threat-free on R 2 it holds that
Assume τ 2 is maximal, in the sense that for any π ∈ Cont(σ 1 (1, . . . , R 2 − 1), τ 2 (R 2 )) that is ε-threat-free on R 2 , player i is not facing an ε-threat at round R 2 with respect to π . Pick some arbitrary π 2 ∈ Cont(σ 1 (1, . . . , R 2 −1), τ 2 (R 2 )), and fix σ 2 = (π 2 i , σ −i ). We now repeat the previous procedure, finding the next threat to player i and letting him act on that threat, as follows. For t = 3, 4, . . . we ask, is player i facing an ε-threat with respect to σ t−1 at any round R that follows R t−1 ? If yes, let R t be the next such round: there is no R between R t−1 and R t on which player i faces an ε-threat with respect to σ t−1 .
By Definition 4.7, it follows that there exists a round R t strategy τ t for player i such that Cont(σ t−1 (1, . . . , R t − 1), τ t (R t )) is nonempty, and such that for all π ∈ Cont(σ t−1 (1, . . . , R t − 1), τ t (R t )) and π ∈ Cont(σ t−1 (1, . . . , R t ) ) that are ε-threat-free on R t it holds that
Assume τ t is maximal, in the sense that for any π ∈ Cont(σ t−1 (1, . . . , R t − 1), τ t (R t )) that is ε-threat-free on R t , player i is not facing an ε-threat at round R t with respect to π . Pick some arbitrary π t ∈ Cont(σ t−1 (1, . . . , R t −1), τ t (R t )), and fix σ t = (π t i , σ −i ). Finally, after repeating this for all t until there are no more ε-threats to P i on any round that follows R, we are left with a profile σ C = (π C i , σ −i ) on which player i does not face an ε-threat at any round below R.
Fix ρ = σ C , and recall that, by construction,
We next ask, is player −i facing an ε-threat with respect to ρ at any round S that follows R? As the following claim shows, the answer is positive. CLAIM 8.5. Player −i faces an ε-threat with respect to ρ at some round S that follows R.
PROOF. Suppose not. By our construction of ρ, player i is also not facing an ε-threat with respect to ρ at any round that follows R. This means that the profile ρ is ε-threatfree on the subgames R.
Since ρ ∈ Cont(σ (1, . . . , R − 1), τ (R)) and since σ ∈ Cont(σ (1, . . . , R) ) is ε-threat-free on R, we can then use (6) to infer that
However, since ρ = (π C i , σ −i ) is a unilateral deviation of player i, this contradicts the fact that σ constitutes an ε-NE.
Let S 1 be the latest round on which P −i faces an ε-threat with respect to ρ. By Definition 4.7, it follows that there exists a round S 1 strategy μ 1 for player −i such that Cont(ρ(1, . . . , S 1 −1), μ 1 (S 1 )) is nonempty, and such that for all π ∈ Cont(ρ(1, . . . , S 1 − 1), μ 1 (S 1 )) and π ∈ Cont(ρ(1, . . . , S 1 )) that are ε-threat-free on S 1 it holds that
Assume μ 1 is maximal, in the sense that for any π ∈ Cont(ρ(1, . . . , S 1 −1), μ 1 (S 1 )) that is ε-threat-free on S 1 , player −i is not facing an ε-threat at round S 1 with respect to π . Pick some ρ 1 ∈ Cont(ρ(1, . . . , S 1 −1), μ 1 (S 1 )) that is ε-threat-free on S 1 -such a ρ 1 must exist by Proposition 4.9. Now, note that because S 1 was the last round on which P −i faces an ε-threat, and because P i does not face an ε-threat at any round following R with respect to ρ, it must be the case that ρ is ε-threat-free on S 1 . Since ρ ∈ Cont(ρ(1, . . . , S 1 )), we then have that
where the second inequality follows from (7). We now repeat the above procedure, finding the preceding threat to player −i (but that still follows R) and letting him act on that threat, as follows. For t = 2, 3, . . ., we ask, is P −i facing an ε-threat with respect to ρ t−1 at any round S that follows R? If yes, let S t be the latest such round. By Definition 4.7, it follows that there exists a round S t strategy μ t for player −i such that Cont(ρ t−1 (1, . . . , S t −1), μ t (S t )) is nonempty, and such that for all π ∈ Cont(ρ t−1 (1, . . . , S t −1), μ t (S t )) and π ∈ Cont(ρ t−1 (1, . . . , S t )) that are ε-threat-free on S t it holds that
Assume μ t is maximal, in the sense that for any π ∈ Cont(ρ t −1 (1, . . . , S t − 1), μ t (S t )) that is ε-threat-free on S t , player −i is not facing an ε-threat at round S t with respect to π . Pick some ρ t ∈ Cont(ρ t−1 (1, . . . , S t − 1), μ t (S t )) that is ε-threat-free on S t -again, such a ρ t must exist by Proposition 4.9. Now, note that because S t was the last round on which P −i faces an ε-threat, P −i does not face an ε-threat with respect to ρ t−1 at any round following S t . Since ρ t−1 was chosen to be ε-threat free on S t−1 , player i does not face an ε-threat with respect to ρ t−1 at any round following S t−1 . Finally, by construction, P i does not face an ε-threat at any round following R with respect to ρ. Since ρ and ρ t−1 are equivalent up to round S t−1 , it must be the case that P i does not face an ε-threat with respect to ρ t−1 at any round between S t and S t−1 either. Thus, ρ t−1 is ε-threat-free on S t . Since ρ t−1 ∈ Cont(ρ t−1 (1, . . . , S t )), we then have that
Finally, after repeating this for all t until there are no more ε-threats to P −i at any round that follows R, we are left with a profile ρ D ∈ Cont(σ (1, . . . , R − 1), τ (R)) on which both P i and P −i are not facing an ε-threat at any round that follows R. We can then use (6) to infer that
We conclude that on the profile ρ D both players strictly improve over σ , contradicting the weak Pareto optimality of σ . Hence, no player faces an ε-threat with respect to σ at any round R, and this, coupled with the fact that σ is an ε-NE, yields that profile an ε-TFNE.
APPENDIX
A function f is one-way if it is easy to compute but hard to invert given the image of a random input. More formally, We present Definition A.1 Definition A.1 (One- Way Functions) . A function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * is said to be one-way if the following two conditions hold.
(1) There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that on input x outputs f (x).
(2) For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every polynomial p(·), and all sufficiently large n's
where U n denotes the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n .
In this article, we also deal with one-way permutations, and we note that this definition naturally extends to consider permutations.
A commitment scheme is a two-stage interactive protocol between a sender and a receiver. After the first stage of the protocol, which is referred to as the commit stage, the sender is bound to at most one value, not yet revealed to the receiver. In the second stage, which is referred to as the reveal stage, the sender reveals its committed value to the receiver. For simplicity of exposition, we will focus on bit-commitment schemes, that is, commitment schemes in which the committed value is only one bit. A bit-commitment scheme is defined via a triplet of probabilistic polynomial-time Turingmachines (S, R, V) such that: -S receives as input the security parameter 1 n and a bit b. Following its interaction, it outputs some information decom (the decommitment). -R receives as input the security parameter 1 n . Following its interaction, it outputs a state information com (the commitment). -V (acting as the receiver in the reveal stage 13 ) receives as input the security parameter 1 n , a commitment com and a decommitment decom. It outputs either a bit b or ⊥.
Denote by (decom|com) ← S(1 n , b), R(1 n ) the experiment in which S and R interact (using the given inputs and uniformly chosen random coins), and then S outputs decom while R outputs com. It is required that for all n, every bit b, and every pair (decom|com) that may be output by S(1 n , b), R(1 n ) , it holds that V(com, decom) = b. 14 The security of a commitment scheme can be defined in two complementary ways, protecting against either an all-powerful sender or an all-powerful receiver. The former are referred to as statistically binding commitment schemes, whereas the latter are referred to as statistically hiding commitment schemes. For simplicity, we assume that the associated "error" is zero, resulting in perfectly binding and perfectly hiding commitments schemes.
In order to define the security properties of such schemes, we first introduce the following notation. Given a commitment scheme (S, R, V) and a Turing machine R * , we denote by view S(b),R * (1 n ) the distribution of the view of R * when interacting with S(1 n , b). This view consists of R * 's random coins and of the sequence of messages it receives from S. The distribution is taken over the random coins of both S and R. Similarly, given a Turing machine S * we denote by view S * (1 n ),R (1 n ) the view of S * when interacting with R(1 n ). Note that whenever no computational restrictions are assumed on S * or R * , then, without loss of generality, they can be assumed to be deterministic. V(com, decom) = 0 V(com, decom ) = 1 = 0 , 13 Note that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the reveal stage is noninteractive. This is since any such interactive stage can be replaced with a noninteractive one as follows: The sender sends its internal state to the receiver, who then simulates the sender in the interactive stage. 14 Although we assume perfect completeness, it is not essential for our results.
for all sufficiently large n, where the probability is taken over the random coins of R.
Perfectly binding commitments can be constructed assuming the existence of any one-way permutation [Blum 1981 ]. The construction is "noninteractive," meaning that the commitment phase consists of a single message sent from the sender S to the receiver R. This is the kind of commitment we will use in the protocol for the coinflipping game (in Section 6).
Definition A.3 (Perfectly Hiding Commitment). A bit-commitment scheme (S, R, V) is said to be perfectly hiding if it satisfies the following two properties.
-Perfect Hiding. for every Turing machine R * the ensembles {view S(0),R * (1 n )} n∈N and {view S(1),R * (1 n )} n∈N are identically distributed. -Computational Binding. for every probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine S * the exists a negligible function μ(n) so that Pr ((decom, decom )|com) ← S * (1 n ), R(1 n ) : V(com, decom) = 0 V(com, decom ) = 1 < μ(n) , for all sufficiently large n, where the probability is taken over the random coins of both S * and R.
Perfectly hiding commitments can be constructed assuming the existence of any oneway permutation [Naor et al. 1998 ]. This construction is "highly-interactive," in that the commitment phase requires the exchange of n − 1 messages between the sender and the receiver, where n is the security parameter. By relaxing the hiding condition to be only "statistical" it is possible to weaken the underlying assumption to the existence of one-way functions [Haitner and Reingold 2007] . Assuming the existence of collision resistant hash functions, it is possible to construct two-message statistically hiding commitments [Naor and Yung 1989; Damgård et al. 1993 ].
